A central tenet of theoretical cryptography is the study of the minimal assumptions required to implement a given cryptographic primitive. One such primitive is the one-time memory (OTM), introduced by Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum [CRYPTO 2008], which is a classical functionality modeled after a non-interactive 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, and which is complete for one-time classical and quantum programs. It is known that secure OTMs do not exist in the standard model in both the classical and quantum settings. Here, we show how to use quantum information, together with the assumption of stateless (i.e., reusable) hardware tokens, to build statistically secure OTMs. This is in sharp contrast with the classical case, where stateless hardware tokens alone cannot yield OTMs. In addition, our scheme is technologically simple. We prove security in the quantum universal composability framework, employing semi-definite programming results of Molina, Vidick and Watrous [TQC 2013] 
Introduction
The study of theoretical cryptography is centered around the question of building cryptographic primitives secure against adversarial attacks. In order to allow a broader set of such primitives to be implemented, one often considers restricting the power of the adversary. For example, one can limit the computing power of adversaries to be polynomial bounded [Yao82, BM82] , restrict the storage of adversaries to be bounded or noisy [Mau92, CM97, DFSS05] , or make trusted setups available to honest players [Kil88, BFM88, Can01, CLOS02, IPS08, PR08, LPV09, MPR09, MPR10, MR11, KMQ11, KMPS14], to name a few. One wellknown trusted setup is tamper-proof hardware [Kat07, GKR08] , which is assumed to provide a specific input-output functionality, and which can only be accessed in a "black box" fashion. The hardware can maintain a state (i.e., is stateful) and possibly carry out complex functionality, but presumably may be difficult or expensive to implement or manufacture. This leads to an interesting research direction: Build cryptography primitives using the simplest (and hence easiest and cheapest to manufacture) hardware.
In this respect, two distinct simplified notions of hardware have captured considerable interest. The first is the notion of a one-time memory (OTM) [GKR08] , which is arguably the simplest possible notion of stateful hardware. An OTM, modeled after a non-interactive 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, behaves as follows: first, a player (called the sender) embeds two values s 0 and s 1 into the OTM, and then gives the OTM to another player (called the receiver). The receiver can now read his choice of precisely one of s 0 or s 1 ; after this "use" of the OTM, however, the unread bit is lost forever. Interestingly, OTMs are complete for implementing one-time use programs (OTPs): given access to OTMs, one can implement statistically secure OTPs for any efficiently computable program in the universal composability (UC) framework [GIS + 10].
(OTPs, in turn, have applications in software protection and one-time proofs [GKR08] .) In the quantum given a physical explanation in terms of the no-cloning theorem [WZ82] , or the Heisenberg uncertainty relation [Hei27] .
Formally, we show statistical or information-theoretic security in the quantum Universal Composability (UC) framework [Unr10] , which allows us to make strong security claims in terms of the composability of our protocol within others. Such a security proof requires the construction of a simulator, such that for any "quantum environment" wishing to interact with the OTM, the environment statistically cannot tell whether it is interacting with the ideal OTM functionality or the real OTM instance provided by our scheme. The security of this simulator requires a statement of the following form: Given access to a (randomly chosen) "quantum key" |ψ k and corresponding stateless token V k , it is highly unlikely for an adversary to successfully extract keys for both the secret bits s 0 and s 1 held by V k , even if the adversary is allowed to interact with V k multiple times. The proof of this statement proceeds in two parts. First, in Appendix B.2, we show that the probability of an adversary succeeding with interaction with V k is polynomially related to that of succeeding without interaction with V k . This part is shown using a combinatorial technique of Pastawski et al. [PYJ + 12] from the setting of quantum money. Second, in Appendix B.3, we show that the probability of succeeding without interaction is exponentially small in n, the number of qubits in the quantum key |ψ k . This is shown using semidefinite programming results of Molina, Vidick and Watrous [MVW13] , also from the context of quantum money. Both of these proof steps are sketched in Section 3.3.
Summarizing, we show the following.
Main Theorem (informal). There exists a protocol Π, which together with a classical stateless token and the ability to randomly prepare single qubits in one of four pure states, implements the OTM functionality with statistical security in the UC framework against a corrupted receiver of the OTM.
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS. When combined with prior results, by using the quantum lifting technique of Unruh [Unr10] , our theorem above implies: quantum one-time classical programs [GIS + 10], and quantum one-time quantum programs [BGS13] (in both cases, with security against a corrupt receiver only).
Related work. Our work contributes to the growing list of functionalities achievable with quantum information, yet unachievable classically. This includes: unconditionally secure key expansion [BB84] , physically uncloneable money [Wie83, MVW13, PYJ + 12], a reduction from oblivious transfer to bit commitment [BBCS92, DFL + 09] and to other primitives such as "cut-and choose" functionality [FKS + 13], and revocable time-release quantum encryption [Unr14] . Importantly, these protocols all make use of the technique of conjugate coding [Wie83] , which is also an important technique used in protocols for OT in the bounded quantum storage and noisy quantum storage models [DFSS05, WST08] (see [BS15] for a survey). A number of proof techniques have been developed in the context of conjugate coding, including entropic uncertainty relations [WW10] . In the context of QKD, another successful technique is the use of de Finetti reductions [Ren08] (which exploit the symmetry of the scheme in order to simplify the analysis). Recently, semidefinite programming approaches have been applied to analyze security of conjugate coding [MVW13] . This is the approach that we adopt for the "non-interactive" portion of our proof (Section B. [MVW13] have studied schemes based on conjugate coding similar to ours, but in the context of quantum money. In contrast to our setting, the schemes of [PYJ + 12] and [MVW13] (for example) involve dynamically chosen random challenges from a verifier to the holder of a "quantum banknote", whereas in our work here the "challenges" are fixed (i.e. measure all qubits in the Z or X basis to obtain secret bit s 0 or s 1 , respectively), and the verifier is replaced by a stateless token.
Also, we note that prior work has achieved oblivious transfer using quantum information, together with some assumption (e.g. bit commitment [BBCS92] or bounded quantum storage [DFSS05] ). These protocols typically use an interaction phase similar to the "commit-and-open" protocol of [BBCS92] ; because we are working in the non-interactive setting, these techniques appear to be inapplicable.
Finally, we mention related work by Liu [Liu14a, Liu14b, Liu15] , which establishes stand-alone secure OTMs using quantum information. In contrast to our setting, in which an adversary's allowed quantum gate set is unrestricted, Liu's results are set in the isolated-qubit model, which assumes that an adversary can perform only single-qubit operations (thus, no entangling gates are permitted). We remark that, the security notion of OTMs by Liu is much weaker than the simulation-based notion that is studied in this paper, and it is unclear whether this type of OTM is composable; the main goal there is to show feasibility without using any trusted setup assumptions.
Significance. Our results show a strong separation between the classical and quantum settings, since classically, stateless tokens cannot be used to securely implement OTMs. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to combine conjugate coding with stateless hardware tokens. Moreover, while our protocol shares similarities with prior work in the setting of quantum money, building OTMs appears to be a new focus here 2 .
Our protocol has a simple implementation, fitting into the single-qubit prepare-and-measure paradigm (in fact, one needs only the ability to prepares states |0 , |1 , |+ , |− ). Thus, our scheme is in principle amenable to experimental implementations (the quantum portion of our protocol, could, in principle, be implemented using current hardware for quantum key distribution [BB84] ). In addition, from a theoretical cryptographic perspective, our protocol is attractive in that its implementation requires an assumption of a stateless hardware token, which is conceivably easier and cheaper to mass produce than a stateful token.
In terms of security guarantees, we allow arbitrary operations on behalf of a malicious quantum receiver in our protocol (i.e. all operations allowed by quantum mechanics), with the adversary only restricted in that the stateless token is assumed only usable as a black box. The security we obtain is statistical, with the only computational assumption being on the number of queries made to the token (i.e. in order to break the scheme, an adversary must make an exponential number of calls to the token, and moreover this is sufficient, as clearly one can try all possible keys via brute force in this time). Finally, our proofs are rigorous statements in the quantum UC framework, meaning our protocol can be easily composed with others proved secure in this framework (e.g. combining our results with [BGS13] 's protocol immediately yields UC-secure quantum OTPs against a dishonest receiver).
Finally, we close by remarking that our scheme is "tight" with respect to two impossibility results. First, the assumption that the token be queried only in the computational basis cannot be relaxed: Section 4.1 shows that if the token can be queried in superposition, then an adversary in our setting can easily break any OTM scheme. Second, our scheme has the property that corresponding to each secret bit s i held by the token, there are exponentially many valid keys one can input to the token to extract s i . In Section 4.2, we show that for any "measure-and-access" OTM (i.e. an OTM in which one measures a given quantum key and uses the classical measurement result to access a token to extract data, of which our protocol is an example), a polynomial number of keys implies the ability to break the scheme with inverse polynomial probability (more generally, ∆ keys allows probability at least 1/∆ 2 of breaking the scheme).
Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 with preliminaries, including the ideal functionalities for an OTM and stateless token. In Section 3, we give our construction for an OTM based on a stateless hardware token; the proof ideas for security are also provided. In Section 4, we discuss "tightness" of our construction by showing two impossibility results for "relaxations" of our scheme. Due to space constraints, we include the description of classical UC and quantum UC in Appendix A. Appendix B gives a formal proof upper bounding the maximum probability with which two accepting keys for a token V can be extracted from a single quantum key |ψ . (These results are used to finish the security proof in Section 3.) In addition, the security proof for a lemma in Section 4 can be found in Appendix C.
Preliminaries
Notation. We say two binary distributions X and Y are indistinguishable, denoted X ≈ Y, if it holds that |Pr(X n = 1) − Pr(Y n = 1)| ≤ negl(n). We define single-qubit |0 + = |0 and |1 + = |1 , so that {|0 + , |1 + } form the rectilinear basis. We also define |0 × =
Quantum universal composition (UC) framework. We consider simulation-based security in this paper.
In particular, we prove the security of our construction in the quantum universal composition (UC) framework [Unr10] . Please see Appendix A for a brief description of the classical UC [Can01] and the quantum UC [Unr10] . In the next two paragraphs, we introduce two relevant ideal functionalities of one-time memory and of stateless hardware token.
One-time memory (OTM).
The one-time memory (OTM) functionality F OTM involves two parties, the sender and the receiver, and consists of two phases, "Create" and "Execute". Please see Functionality 1 below for details; for the sake of simplicity, we have omitted the session/party identifiers as they should be implicitly clear from the context. We sometimes refer to this functionality F OTM as an OTM token.
Functionality 1 Ideal functionality F OTM .
1. Create: Upon input (s 0 , s 1 ) from the sender, with s 0 , s 1 ∈ {0, 1}, send create to the receiver and store (s 0 , s 1 ).
2. Execute: Upon input b ∈ {0, 1} from the receiver, send s b to receiver. Delete any trace of this instance.
Stateless hardware. The original work of Katz [Kat07] introduces the ideal functionality F wrap to model stateful tokens in the UC-framework. In the ideal model, a party that wants to create a token, sends the Turing machine to F wrap . F wrap will then run the machine (keeping the state), when the designed party will ask for it. The same functionality can be adapted to model stateless tokens. It is sufficient that the functionality does not keep the state between two executions. A simplified version of the F wrap functionality as shown in [CGS08] (that is very similar to the F wrap of [Kat07] ) is described below. Note that, again for the sake of simplicity, we have omitted the session/party identifiers as they should be implicitly clear from the context. Although the environment and adversary are unbounded, we specify that stateless hardware can be queried only a polynomial number of times. This is necessary, since otherwise the hardware token model is vacuous (with unbounded queries, the entire input-output behavior of stateless hardware can be deduced, hence there is nothing left to hide).
Functionality 2 Ideal functionality F wrap . The functionality is parameterized by a polynomial p(·), and an implicit security parameter n 1. Create: Upon input (create, M) from the sender, where where M is a Turing machine, send create to the receiver and store M.
Execute:
Upon input (run, msg) from the receiver, execute M(msg) for at most p(n) steps, and let out be the response. Let out := ⊥ if M does not halt in p(n) steps. Send out to the receiver.
Feasibility of Quantum OTMs using Stateless Hardware
In this section, we present a quantum construction for one-time memories by using stateless hardware (Section 3.1). We also state our main theorem (Theorem 3.1). In Section 3.2, we describe the Simulator and prove Theorem 3.1 using the technical results of Appendix B. The intuition and techniques behind the proofs in Appendix B are sketched in Section 3.3.
Construction
We now present the OTM protocol Π in the F wrap hybrid model, between a sender P s and a receiver P r .
Here the security parameter is n.
Upon receiving input (s 0 , s 1 ) from the environment where s 0 , s 1 ∈ {0, 1}, sender P s operates as follows:
• The sender chooses random strings x ∈ R {0, 1} n and θ ∈ R {+, ×} n , and prepares |x θ . Then the sender, based on tuple (s 0 , s 1 , x, θ), prepares the program M as in Program 1.
Program 1 Program for hardware token
Hardcoded values: s 0 , s 1 ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ {0, 1} n , and θ ∈ {+, ×} n Inputs: y ∈ {0, 1} n and b ∈ {0, 1}, where y is a claimed measured value for the quantum register, and b the evaluator's choice bit 1. If b = 0, check that the θ = + positions return the correct bits in y according to x. If Accept, output s 0 . Otherwise output ⊥. 2. If b = 1, check that the θ = × positions return the correct bits in y according to x. If Accept, output s 1 . Otherwise output ⊥.
• The sender sends |x θ to the receiver.
• The sender sends (create, M) to functionality F wrap , and the functionality sends create to notify the receiver.
The receiver P r operates as follows: Upon input b from the environment, and |x θ from the receiver, and create notification from F wrap ,
• If b = 0, measure |x θ in the computational basis to get string y and input (run, (y, b)) into F wrap .
• If b = 1, apply H ⊗n to |x θ , then measure in the computational basis to get string y and input (run, (y, b)) into F wrap .
Return the output of F wrap to the environment. It is easy to see that the output of F wrap is s b for both b = 0 and b = 1.
Note again that the hardware token, as defined in Program 1, accepts only classical input (i.e. it cannot be queried in superposition). As mentioned earlier, relaxing this assumption yields impossibility of a secure OTM implementation, as shown in Section 4. Our main theorem is now stated as follows. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1
To prove Theorem 3.1, we must construct and analyze an appropriate simulator, which we now proceed to do.
The simulator
In order to prove Theorem 3.1, for any unbounded adversary A who corrupts the receiver, we need to build a simulator S (having access to the OTM functionality F OTM ), such that for any unbounded environment Z, the executions in the real model and that in simulation are statistically indistinguishable. Our simulator S is given below:
The simulator emulates an internal copy of the adversary A who corrupts the receiver. The simulator emulates the communication between A and the external environment Z by forwarding the communication messages between A and Z. The simulator S needs to emulate the whole view for the adversary A. First, the simulator picks dummy inputss 0 = 0 ands 1 = 0, and randomly chooses x ∈ {0, 1} n , and θ ∈ {+, ×} n , and generates program M. Then the simulator plays the role of the sender to send |x θ to the adversary A (who controls the corrupted receiver). The simulator also emulates F wrap to notify A by sending create to indicate that the hardware is ready for queries. For each query (run, (b, y)) to F wrap from the adversary A, the simulator evaluates programM (that is created based ons 0 ,s 1 , x, θ) as in the construction, and then acts as follows:
1. If this is a rejecting input, output ⊥. 3. If this is a subsequent accepting input, output s b (as above).
Analysis
We now show that the simulation and the real model execution are statistically indistinguishable. There are two cases in an execution of the simulation which we must consider:
Case 1: In all its queries to F wrap , the accepting inputs of A have the same choice bit b. In this case, the simulation is perfectly indistinguishable. Case 2: In its queries to F wrap , A produces accepting inputs for both b = 0 and b = 1. In this case, the simulation fails (the environment can distinguish the real model from the ideal model), since the simulator is only able to retrieve a single bit from the external OTM functionality F OTM (either corresponding to b = 0 or b = 1).
Thus, whereas in Case 1 the simulator behaves perfectly, in Case 2 it is in trouble. Fortunately, in Theorem B.1 we show that the probability that Case 2 occurs is exponentially small in n, the number of qubits comprising |x θ . Specifically, we show that for an arbitrary m-query strategy (i.e. any quantum strategy allowed by quantum mechanics, whether efficiently implementable or not, which queries the token at most m times), the probability of Case 2 occurring is at most 2(
) n . Since m is assumed to be polynomially-bounded, this expression is exponentially small in n. This concludes the proof.
Security analysis for the token: Intuition
Our simulation proof showing statistical security of our Quantum OTM construction of Section 3.1 relies crucially on Theorem B.1, which can informally be stated as follows: given a single copy of n-qubit state |x θ , the probability that an unbounded adversary is able to extract both bits s 0 and s 1 is exponentially small (in n), even if the adversary is allowed to query the token a polynomial number of times.
We first give a formal statement of this result, followed by the intuition behind its proof (the full proof is given in Appendix B). In our discussion, we shall switch to a quantum information view for the stateless token (as opposed to the cryptographic view used in Sections 2 and 3), since this is the setting in which we show Theorem B.1. Specifically, we model a stateless token V as a map from a query register Q to a set of three strings: 000 for "reject", 10s 0 for "accept and return s 0 ", and 01s 1 for "accept and return s 1 ". Furthermore, we refer to the states |x θ (i.e. the "quantum keys") from conjugate coding as BB84 states, for the important role that they play in the quantum key distribution protocol [BB84] . For convenience, we refer to a BB84 key |x θ as state |ψ k , with corresponding token V k (since the verification program of V k depends on k). Finally, for any finite dimensional complex Hilbert space X , we use D(X ) to denote the set of density operators acting on X (see Section B.1 for further quantum information notation). 
Intuitively, the adversary's strategy Φ attempts to map the input BB84 key |ψ k to a pair of classical secret keys, one for s 0 and one for s 1 , stored in register Q ⊗ Q, which is then checked by two parallel runs of V k , i.e. by V k ⊗ V k . Note that the adversary's strategy is modeled by an arbitrary TPCP map Φ, meaning any strategy allowable by the laws of quantum mechanics (whether efficiently implementable or not) is permitted.
To prove this statement, we proceed in two steps: First, we show that the ability to adaptively query the hardware token m times can improve the success probability of extracting a pair of keys from |ψ k for s 0 and s 1 by at most a polynomial factor in m (in comparison to the setting in which no queries to the token are allowed). Second, we show that if the adversary cannot query the token, then it can extract keys from |ψ k for both s 0 and s 1 with probability at most inverse exponential in n, the number of key bits.
Step 1: Eliminating interaction with the token. To reduce the interactive setting to the non-interactive one, we apply a combinatorial technique of Reference [PYJ + 12]. In [PYJ + 12], this approach was used to analyze two schemes for quantum money in which a verification oracle is queried (possibly multiple times), with each query outputting a single bit (i.e. accept or reject). Our setting, however, requires a classical oracle which outputs multiple bits, i.e. accept/reject, along with possibly multiple secret bits for the accept case. For this part of the proof, we observe that the technique of [PYJ + 12] can be easily generalized to any setting of the following form: One is given (according to some distribution) a state |ψ k and classical oracle V k , and asked to measure |ψ k to determine some classical key to input to V k in order to obtain some desired output from V k . Unlike [PYJ + 12], the oracles V k can output strings of any length -the only restriction is that all V k must share the same set of output strings (i.e. the set of output strings is independent of k, so that intuitively, no information about keys is leaked by the output of V k ).
To make this formal, we introduce the notion of a fixed-output ensemble of states and oracles. Specifically, let X , Q be finite dimensional Hilbert spaces. A fixed-output ensemble {|ψ k , V k } of states |ψ k ∈ X and oracles V k is one with the following properties. Each V k accepts a (mixed) state ρ ∈ D(Q)
, and outputs t bits according to these rules: To denote "reject", V k outputs 0 t . Otherwise, V k outputs a non-zero t-bit string y; denote the set of such "good" outputs y as G ⊆ {0, 1} t . Crucially, each V k may have a distinct set of measurement
, but all V k share the same set of output strings G ∪ 0 t (hence the name fixed-output). The formal statement we now show is below, and its proof follows that of Theorem 9 of [PYJ + 12] closely. 
where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Then, for any strategy Γ which, given |ψ k with probability 1/ |S|, queries V k m times, it holds that the probability that at least two queries to V k return distinct strings in G is at most ( m 2 ) |G| (|G| − 1)p. Thus, querying the token V m times can increase the probability of success by at most a poly(m) factor (note that in our setting, |G| = 2).
Intuitively, the proof of Lemma 3.3 proceeds as follows. One first observes that the action of the adversary, Γ, can be characterized by a sequence of m + 1 non-interactive TPCP maps Γ i , where map i is determined by query answers q 1 through q i−1 . In general, there are hence 2 m such sequences of non-interactive maps Γ i to consider. However, we are only interested in sequences of queries which yield at least two accepting queries extracting both s 0 and s 1 . This intuitively reduces the number of sequences of maps which must be explicitly considered to ( m 2 ) (i.e. choose the two query positions in which the first two successful queries were made), which is polynomial in m. But by the assumption of Lemma 3.3, any fixed non-interactive map succeeds at extracting both s 0 and s 1 with probability at most p. Roughly, adding the success probabilities of all ( m 2 ) non-interactive sequences of maps we need to consider now yields the desired success probability of at most poly(m) times p.
Step 2: Bounding cheating probabilities in the non-interactive setting. By Step 1, we are reduced to the question: Given BB84 state |ψ k and no query access to token V k , what is the maximum probability with which accepting keys for both s 0 and s 1 can be extracted? To analyze this, we apply the semidefinite programming based results of Molina, Vidick, and Watrous [MVW13] , which studied similar BB84-based schemes in the context of quantum money. The lemma below is a special case of Lemma 5 of [MVW13] (our re-statement below is formulated with respect to the context of this paper), whose proof is essentially identical to that of Lemma 5 of [MVW13] , save for some minor modifications for our setting. (The full proof is given in Appendix B.3. 
The proof of Lemma 3.4 is based on semidefinite programming (SDPs) (a brief primer on SDPs is given in Appendix B.1). Specifically, one first considers the case of n = 1, i.e. the BB84 key is a single qubit (this means the secret key for either s 0 or s 1 is empty, but crucially the adversary does not know for which s i this holds). In the non-interactive setting, one can formulate the optimal probability of producing accepting keys for both s 0 and s 1 as a primal SDP via the Choi-Jamiołkowski representation of linear maps [Cho75, Jam72] . In particular, this representation encodes an arbitrary TPCP map Φ as a positive semi-definite matrix J(Φ) (satisfying additional properties which can be encoded as a linear constraint). Via the corresponding dual SDP and duality theory, one can then upper bound the optimal value of the primal SDP. In particular, one can demonstrate a dual feasible solution Y which yields a (tight) upper bound on the cheating probability of α = 1/2 + 1/(2 √ 2) ≈ 0.854. The argument generalizes analogously to the setting of n BB84 key qubits where n > 1, in which a similar primal SDP can be formulated, and for which the dual feasible solution Y ⊗n yields a (tight) upper bound on the cheating probability of α n , which is inverse exponential in n.
Impossibility Results
We now discuss "tightness" of our protocol with respect to impossibility results. To begin, it is easy to argue that OTMs cannot exist in the plain model (i.e. without additional assumptions) in both the classical and quantum settings: in the classical setting, impossibility holds, since software can always be copied. Quantumly, this follows by a simple rewinding argument [BGS13] . Here, we give two simple no-go results for the quantum setting which support the idea that our scheme is "tight" in terms of the minimality of the assumptions it uses: First, a stateless token which can be queried in superposition cannot be used to securely construct an OTM (Section 4.1). Second, for measure and access schemes such as ours, in order for a stateless token to allow statistical security, it must have an exponential number of keys per secret bit (Section 4.2).
Impossibility: Tokens which can be queried in superposition
In our construction, we require that all queries to the token be classical strings, i.e. no querying in superposition is allowed. It is easy to argue via a standard rewinding argument that relaxing this requirement yields impossibility of a secure OTM, as we now show. Specifically, let M be a quantum OTM implemented using a hardware token. Without loss of generality, we may model the token as an oracle O f realizing a function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} in the standard way, i.e. for all y ∈ {0, 1} n and b ∈ {0, 1}, O f |y |b = |y |b ⊕ f (y) . Now, suppose our OTM stores two secret bits s 0 and s 1 , and provides the receiver with an initial state |ψ ∈ A ⊗ B ⊗ C, where A, B, and C are ancilla (i.e. algorithm's workspace), query (i.e. input to O f ), and answer (i.e. O f 's answers) registers, respectively. By definition, an honest receiver must be able to access precisely one of s 0 or s 1 with certainty, given |ψ . Thus, for any i ∈ {0, 1}, there exists a quantum query
For any choice of i, however, this implies a malicious receiver can now classically copy s i to an external register, and then "rewind" by applying A † i to |ψ ′ AB |s i C to recover |ψ . Applying A i ′ for i ′ = i to |ψ now yields the second bit i ′ with certainty as well. We conclude that a quantum OTM which allows superposition queries to a stateless token is insecure (assuming an adversary is not restricted in the quantum operations it can apply). 
Remark 4.1. (1) It is because the token is stateless that we are able to model it here via the standard oracle query framework used in the quantum query complexity literature. It is easy to see that the argument above breaks down for a "stateful" token. Specifically, suppose the token is allowed to have a private memory.

Then, one can design the token such that each time it is queried, it copies the n input qubits in B via CNOT gates to a fresh set of n ancilla qubits initialized to all zeroes -this effectively forces a measurement in the computational basis on B, which prevents
Impossibility: Tokens with a bounded number of keys
We have observed that allowing superposition queries to the token prevents an OTM from being secure. One might next ask how simple a hardware token with classical queries can be, while still allowing a secure OTM. We now explore one such strengthening of our construction in which the token is forced to have a bounded number of keys.
To formalize this, let us define the notion of a "measure-and-access (MA)" OTM, i.e. an OTM in which given an initial state |ψ , an honest receiver applies a prescribed measurement to |ψ , and feeds the resulting classical string (i.e. key) y into the token O f to obtain s i . Our construction is an example of a MA memory in which each bit s i has an exponential number of valid keys y such that f (y) = s i . One might ask whether the construction can be strengthened such that each s i has a bounded number (e.g. a polynomial number) of keys. We now show that such a strengthening would preclude security.
For clarity, implicitly in our proof below, we model the oracle O f as having three possible outputs: 0, 1, or 2, where 2 is output whenever O f is fed an invalid key y. This is required for the notion of having "few" keys to make sense (i.e. there are 2 n candidate keys, and only two secret bits, each of which is supposed to have a bounded number of keys). Note that our construction indeed fits into this framework. 
A.2 Quantum UC Model ([Unr10])
Now, we give a high-level description of quantum UC model by Unruh [Unr10] .
Quantum Machine. In the quantum UC model, all players are modeled as quantum machines. A quantum machine is a sequence of quantum circuits {M n } n∈N , for each security parameter n. M n is a completely positive trace preserving operator on space H state ⊗ H class ⊗ H quant , where H state represents the internal workspace of M n and H class and H quant represent the spaces for communication, where for convenience we divide the messages into classical and quantum parts. We allow a non-uniform quantum advice 3 to the machine of the environment Z, while all other machines are uniformly generated.
Protocol Execution. In contrast to the communication policy in classical UC model, we consider a network N which contains the space H N := H class ⊗ H quant ⊗ i H state i . Namely, each machine maintains individual internal state space, but the communication space is shared among all . We assume H class contains the message (id sender , id receiver , msg) which specifies the sender and receiver of the current message, and the receiver then processes the quantum state on H quant . Note that this communication model implicitly ensures authentication. In a protocol execution, Z is activated first, and at each round, one player applies the operation defined by its machine M n on H class ⊗ H quant ⊗ H state . In the end Z generates a one-bit output. Denote EXEC[Z, A, Π] the output distribution of Z.
Ideal Functionality. All functionalities we consider in this work are classical, i.e., the inputs and outputs are classical, and its program can be implemented by an efficient classical Turing machine. Here in the quantum UC model, the ideal functionality F is still modeled as a quantum machine for consistency, but it only applies classical operations. Namely, it measures any input message in the computational basis to get an classical bit-string, and implements the operations specified by the classical computational task.
We consider an "dummy protocol", denoted P F , where each party has direct communication with F, who accomplishes the desired task according to the messages received from the players. The execution of P F with environment Z and an adversary, usually called the simulator S, is defined analogous as above, in particular, S monitors the communication between corrupted parties and the ideal functionality F. Similarly, we denote Z's output distribution as EXEC[Z, S, P F ]. For simplicity, we also write it as EXEC[Z, S, F ]. Definition A.3 (Quantum UC-secure Emulation). We say Π quantum-UC-emulates Π ′ if for any quantum adversary A, there exists a (quantum) simulator S such that for all quantum environments Z,
We consider here that A and Z are computationally unbounded, we call it (quantum) statistical UC-security. We require the running time S is polynomial in that of A. We call this property Polynomial Simulation.
Similarly, (quantum) computational UC-security can be defined. Let F be a well-formed two party functionality. We say Π quantum-UC-realizes F if for all quantum adversary A, there exists a (quantum) simulator S such that for all quantum environments Z,
Quantum UC-secure protocols also admit general composition: 
B Security Analysis for the Token
We now provide the technical result (Theorem B.1) that is used to prove security of our Quantum OTM construction of Section 3.1. An informal statement of the following theorem is as follows: given a single copy of n-qubit |x θ , the probability that an unbounded adversary is able to extract both bits s 0 and s 1 is exponentially small (in n), even if the adversary is allowed to query the token a polynomial number of times. For the proofs of this section, we model a token V as outputting one of three strings: 000 for "reject", 10s 0 for "accept and return s 0 ", and 01s 1 for "accept and return s 1 ". Furthermore, we refer to the states (i.e. the quantum keys) from conjugate coding as BB84 state, for the important role that they play in the quantum key distribution protocol [BB84] . 
Proof. The claim follows immediately by setting G = {10s 0 , 01s 1 } and combining Lemmas B.2 and B.3.
Lemmas B.2 and B.3 and their proofs are found in Sections B.2 and B.3, respectively. We begin in Section B.1 by stating the relevant notation for this section, and give brief reviews of quantum channels and semidefinite programming.
B.1 Notation, quantum channels, and semidefinite programming
Notation. Let X be a finite dimensional complex Hilbert space. Then, L(X ), Herm(X ), Pos(X ), and D(X ) denote the sets of linear, Hermitian, positive semidefinite, and density operators acting on X , respectively. The notation A B means A − B is positive semidefinite.
Quantum channels.
is a quantum channel if Φ is trace-preserving and completely positive (TPCP). These are the channels which map density operators to density operators. For the semidefinite programs in Section B.3, a useful representation of linear maps Φ : L(X ) → L(Y ) known as the Choi-Jamiołkowski matrix, J(Φ) ∈ L(Y ⊗ X ), will be used. The latter is defined (with respect to some choice of orthonormal basis {|i } for X ) as
We use the following three properties of J(Φ) [Cho75, Jam72]:
• Φ is completely positive if and only if J(Φ) 0.
• Φ trace-preserving if and only if Tr Y (J(Φ)) = I X .
• For any input state |φ ∈ X and |ψ ∈ Y, Tr(Φ(|φ φ|)|ψ ψ|) = Tr(J(Φ)|ψ ψ| ⊗ |φ φ|) for |φ the complex conjugate of |φ .
Semidefinite programs. We present semidefinite programs (SDPs) in a form useful for quantum information, as done (e.g.) in the notes of Watrous [Wat11] or [MVW13] . For further details, a standard text on convex optimization is Boyd and Vandenberghe [BV04] . Given any 3-tuple (A, B, Φ) for operators A ∈ Herm(X ) and B ∈ Herm(Y ), and linear map Φ : L(X ) → L(Y ) mapping Hermitian operators to Hermitian operators, one can state a primal and dual semidefinite program:
Primal problem (P)
sup Tr(AX)
inf Tr(BY)
where Φ * denotes the adjoint of Φ, which is the unique map satisfying Tr(A † Φ(B)) = Tr((Φ * (A)) † B) for all A ∈ L(Y ) and B ∈ L(X ). The remarkable power of SDPs lies in the concept of weak duality, which states that the optimal value of P is upper bounded by the optimal value of Q. (Note that not all SDPs have feasible solutions; in this case, we label the optimal values as −∞ for P and ∞ for D, respectively.) Thus, if one can phrase a maximization problem Π as an SDP P, then there is a simple method for upper bounding the optimal value of Π -demonstrate a feasible solution for the dual program D. This is precisely the technique used to upper bound the probably of cheating in Section B.3.
B.2 Step 1: Reducing the interactive case to the non-interactive case
To reduce the interactive setting to the non-interactive one, we apply a combinatorial technique of Reference [PYJ + 12] (see Theorem 9 therein). In [PYJ + 12], this approach was used to analyze two schemes for quantum money in which a verification oracle is queried (possibly multiple times), with each query outputting a single bit (i.e. accept or reject). Our setting, however, requires a classical oracle which outputs multiple bits (i.e. accept/reject, along with possibly multiple secret bits for the accept case). In this section, we observe that the technique of [PYJ + 12] can be easily generalized to any setting of the following form:
One is given (according to some distribution) a state |ψ k and classical oracle V k , and asked to measure |ψ k to determine some classical key to input to V k in order to obtain some desired output from V k . Unlike [PYJ + 12], the oracles V k can output strings of any length -the only restriction is that all V k must share the same set of output strings (i.e. the set of output strings is independent of k, so that intuitively, no information about keys is leaked by the output of V k ). We give a formal statement of the generalized presentation of the technique below, and a proof which follows that of , and outputs t bits according to these rules: To denote "reject", V k outputs 0 t . Otherwise, V k outputs a non-zero t-bit string y; denote the set of such "good" outputs y as G ⊆ {0, 1}
t . Note that s = |G| + 1, and t ≥ ⌈log 2 (s)⌉. Crucially, each V k may have a distinct set of measurement operators
, but all V k share the same set of output strings G ∪ 0 t (hence the name fixed-output). 
Lemma B.2 (see also
where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Then, for any strategy Γ which, given |ψ k with probability 1/ |S|, queries V k m times, it holds that the probability that at least two queries to
To apply Lemma B.2 to our setting, we can model our token so that it returns 3 bits: The first two bits are set to 00 for reject, 10 for acceptance of a key for the first choice of secret bit, and 01 for acceptance for the second secret bit. The third bit encodes the desired secret bit. Thus, we define G in Lemma B.2 as G = {10s 0 , 01s 1 } for secret bits s 0 , s 1 ∈ {0, 1}. This generalizes straightforwardly if one wishes to encode more secret bits or even secret strings of longer length. 
Proof of Lemma
This measurement is given by projectors
, where s = |G| + 1, and the Π k i are labelled by outcomes in G ∪ 0 t . Since V k acts in tensor product across different Q i , we may assume without loss of generality that Γ performs the queries in sequence, reading the outcome of query i before performing query i + 1. Thus, we can view Γ as a sequence of TPCP maps Γ i as follows. The first map satisfies
is not equal to the state produced by applying Γ to |ψ k ψ k |, since Γ involves postselection due to oracle queries, which make the reduced state on X consistent with string x. However, since Γ x does not act on register Q i after it applies map Γ i , we can recover the output of Γ on |ψ k ψ k | if we defer V k 's measurement until the end of the computation, and postselect on outcomes x. In other words, for any fixed pair (|ψ k , V k ), the probability that applying Γ to |ψ k ψ k |, up to and including query q, will yield x ∈ ({0, 1} t ) ×q is
∈ M is the projector which outputs measurement outcome x i .
Let Y denote the set of all strings of form x 1 · · · x q satisfying properties (1) q ≤ m (i.e. x corresponds to q ≤ m queries), (2) x i ∈ {0, 1} t for 1 ≤ i ≤ q, (3) x q ∈ G, and (4) there exists precisely one index i = j such that x i = x q and x i ∈ G. Note that the elements of Y can have different lengths, and that |Y| = ( m 2 ) |G| (|G| − 1). Then, the statement of the claim wishes to upper bound the quantity 1
Above, the second equality crucially uses the fact that the ensemble (|ψ k , V k ) is fixed-output, which yields that Y is independent of k, and so the sums commute. As done in [PYJ + 12], observe now that for any
where the last inequality follows by Equation (4) of the claim. Combining this with Equation (5) and the fact that |Y| = ( m 2 ) |G| (|G| − 1), the claim follows.
B.3 Step 2: The non-interactive case
Lemma B.2 yields that in order to prove that it is unlikely for a corrupt receiver to extract both secret bits from the stateless token, it suffices to consider the following question: Given only the initial state |ψ k , what is the maximum probability with which accepting keys (with respect to oracle V k ) for both secret bits can be extracted from |ψ k (i.e. no queries to V k are allowed)? In the terminology of Lemma B.2, we have G = {10s 0 , 01s 1 } for secret bits s 0 , s 1 ∈ {0, 1}, with 000 the string output by V k to denote "reject". To analyze this, we apply the semidefinite programming based results of Molina, Vidick, and Watrous [MVW13] , which studied similar BB84-based schemes in the context of quantum money. The lemma below is a special case of Lemma 5 of [MVW13] (our re-statement below is formulated with respect to the context of this paper), whose proof is essentially identical to that of Lemma 5 of [MVW13] , save for some minor modifications for our setting. For completeness, we give a full proof below. Any modifications to the proof of [MVW13] are explicitly noted; among these is the fact that we require distinct outputs y 1 = y 2 ∈ G below, which results in a better security bound in Lemma B.3 than that obtained in [MVW13] (details in the proof below).
Lemma B.3 (see Lemma 5 of [MVW13]
). Let X = (C 2 ) ⊗n and Q = (C 2 ) ⊗(n+1) , and let S = {|ψ k , V k } be the fixed-output ensemble of states of X and Q corresponding to the construction of Section 3.1. Fix any distinct y 1 , y 2 ∈ G = {10s 0 , 01s 1 }. Then, over all trace-preserving, completely positive (TPCP) maps
We note that the maximum value of (
) is a common constant in quantum information processing, and is attained by the tensor product of single-qubit measurements in the Breidbart basis [BBCS92, BBBW82] .
Proof of Lemma B.3. Recall that in the construction of Section 3.1, our protocol picks |ψ k ∈ (C 2 ) ⊗n by locally setting each qubit (uniformly and independently at random) to one of {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− }. The corresponding oracle V k then accepts a string 0y ∈ {0, 1} n+1 (resp. 1y ∈ {0, 1} n+1 ) if the encoded bits for all the Z-basis (resp. X-basis) qubits of |ψ k are correct; in this case, V k outputs 10s 0 (resp. 01s 1 ). We now produce the semidefinite programming-based (SDP) proof of Lemma 5 of [MVW13] (with very minor modifications, indicated below), which goes as follows: First, the case of n = 1 (i.e. a single-qubit BB84 key) is analyzed. Based on this, a result for the parallel repetition of this 1-qubit scheme n times easily follows. Assume without loss of generality that the adversary (i.e. Φ) places its candidate Z-basis and X-basis keys into the first and second copies of Q, respectively, since recall the goal is for the adversary to obtain distinct outputs y 1 = y 2 ∈ G. (In comparison, [MVW13] decides which question to ask for each copy of Q uniformly at random. Thus, with probability 1/2, it is optimal to place the same key in both copies of Q, obtaining identical outputs y 1 = y 2 ∈ G. This also yields a weaker security bound in [MVW13] .) Then, the primal semidefinite program for the expression in Equation (6) Intuitively, X corresponds to the Choi-Jamiołkowski matrix J(Φ) of some linear map |Φ : L(X ) → L(Q ⊗ Q). The conditions Tr Q⊗Q (X) = I X and X ∈ Pos(Q ⊗ Q ⊗ X ) enforce that Π is trace-preserving and completely positive, respectively. Finally, A acts on five registers (in [MVW13] , A acts on three registers): The first and third of these are single qubits which simply hold the values |0 and |1 , which are the single-bit prefixes (i.e. choice bit b) required by V k for Z-basis and X-basis queries, respectively (these two registers are absent in [MVW13] ). The last register holds the BB84 state which was prepared (i.e. either |0 , |1 , |+ , or |− ), and the second and fourth registers hold the corresponding encoded bit for the Z-and X-bases, respectively. Thus, e.g. when the last register has value |+ , then the second register reads I since any value is allowed here, but the fourth register must read |0 , since this is the encoded bit. Finally, for convenience, let us define A ′ on registers 2, 3, and 4 so that we can rewrite A as
i.e. we have simply factored out registers 1 and 3 in the expression for A. 
(In [MVW13] , the first and third registers are omitted above.) Observing that V 11 = 2I − V 00 , this solution obtains objective value 1/2 + 1/(2 √ 2). This is now shown tight by demonstrating a matching dual solution.
Specifically, the dual SDP is given by U 0 to prepare |φ 1 from Equation (9), which we can express as |φ 1 = ∑ y∈{0,1} n α y |ψ y A |y B |0 C .
for ∑ y α y 2 = 1. Since measuring B next would allow us to retrieve s 0 in register C with certainty, we have that all y appearing in the expansion above satisfy f (y) = s i . Moreover, since s 0 has at most ∆ keys, there exists a key y ′ such that α y ′ 2 ≥ 1/∆. Bob now measures B in the computational basis to obtain |φ 2 from Equation (10), obtaining y ′ with probability at least 1/∆. |y y|. Then, the probability that measuring B in the computational basis now yields a valid key for s 1 is
where we have used the fact that Π good |ψ good = |ψ good (since an honest receiver can extract s 1 with certainty). We conclude that Bob can extract both s 0 and s 1 with probability at least 1/∆ 2 .
